The WTO is here to stay. Institutions are never perfect. The way the WTO, as an institution, runs its business may not be perfect either. Arab countries are attempting to broaden their engagement in the multilateral trading system in a manner that has many implications. This engagement includes accession to the WTO, participation in WTO dispute resolution mechanism, and representations at the WTO.
I. Introduction
Arab countries are attempting to broaden their engagement in the multilateral trading system in a manner that has many implications. Not only have some Arab countries either acceded or are in the pipeline of acceding to the World Trade Organization (WTO), but their new commitments coincide with reorientations in their economic strategies. The path to joining the WTO is a two-way street. Adhering to the rules of the WTO may enhance global confidence in the Arab countries and will likely result in increased flow of investments. Consumers in Arab countries would enjoy access to a wide variety of products that would otherwise be unavailable. Thus, trade can have an overall positive effect. However, the dilemma is how to minimize any losses and capture any benefits that the multilateral trading system has to offer.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the involvement in the multilateral trading system. The proposition in this paper is that the WTO is not a perfect institution. I argue that joining the WTO is a balancing act. In addition, the WTO is not to blame for everything. Arab countries must take the initiatives necessary to effectuate their participation in WTO affairs.
The paper proceeds to discuss in sections II and III early Arab countries' participation in the multilateral trading system, UNCTAD, and WTO. Section IV analyses Arab countries accession to the WTO especially some of the obstacles they face economically or otherwise. Section V provides in-depth discussion of Arab countries participation in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Section VI discusses Arab countries representation in WTO bodies. Finally, the paper concludes with a set of recommendations and suggestions to go forward.
II. Lebanon and Syria in GATT 1947
There were 23 original contracting parties to the GATT when it came into existence in 1947. Among them were Lebanon and Syria, the only Arab contracting parties of the GATT.
1 However, they withdrew from the GATT four years later.
In 1950, Lebanon notified the CONTRACTING PARTIES of its intention to withdraw from the GATT. Then Lebanese Foreign Minister Philippe Takal communicated his government's intention of withdrawal without further elaboration for the reasons of such withdrawal. 2 The only hint for withdrawal was the need for "readapting".
No party is obligated to clarify its reasons for withdrawal from the GATT. The only requirement according to article XXXI is a written notification of withdrawal to the Secretary General of the U.N. Therefore, there is no official reason for Lebanon withdrawal except to "readapt". Moreover, since GATT applied through the Protocol of Provisional Application, any country can withdraw from the Protocol on sixty days' notice rather than the six months' notice required by article XXXI of GATT.
countries, after the end of colonialism, called for a new world economic order that would take their development needs into account. 10 Thus, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") was born. The UNCTAD was set up as a permanent organ of the U.N. General Assembly in 1964, and it meets every four years.
11
In UNCTAD, negotiations were conducted by the bloc approach, with "the Group of 77" representing the developing countries. 12 UNCTAD can be best described as developing countries' GATT. Over the span of its life, UNCTAD's most cited achievement is the GSP system whereby developed countries give preferential, nonreciprocal, and non-discriminatory treatment to developing countries trade.
13
Although the GSP system has functioned with relative success, its limited coverage of beneficiary countries and products coupled with conditions that beneficiary countries must meet before being eligible for such a preferential treatment led to disgruntling feeling on the part of recipients. Moreover, many of UNCTAD's tasks now fall within their accession to the GATT. In other words, they were not entitled to compensation in case tariff concessions were withdrawn. 10 The main reason for driving away from the GATT system is the doctrine of reciprocity embedded in GATT. This doctrine obliges countries to reciprocate their concessions. See Adeoye Akinsanya & Arthur Davies, Third World Quest for a New International Economic Order: An Overview, 33 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 208 (1984) . See also Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974) reprinted in 13 I.L. M. 715 (1974) (asserting that the new international economic order should be founded on full respect for the following principles: ... Preferential and non-reciprocal treatment for developing countries, wherever feasible, in all fields of international economic cooperation whenever possible. Despite all these steps and the signs that the economy is recovering, production of opium poppy accounts for a large share of the Afghani economy. Indeed, the U.S. determined that Afghanistan has failed demonstrably to make significant efforts to adhere to its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and to take the counternarcotics measures set forth in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 thus would be subject to sanctions under the Act. However, it did not decertify Afghanistan and waived those sanctions under national security certifications which would make Afghanistan eligible for U.S. aid that helps the reconstruction efforts in that country. See Pres. Determ. No. 2002 -07, 67 Fed. Reg. 9889 (Feb. 23, 2002 . See also Pres. Determ. No. 2004 -47, 69 Fed. Reg. 57,809 (Feb. 23, 2002 . other Arab countries join the trade body, the universality theme of the WTO could not be achieved.
V. Participation in WTO Dispute Resolution Mechanism
The WTO dispute settlement system has been in effect for nearly ten years. Over This means that other Arab countries are marginalized. Views of Arab countries may be communicated to Egypt which might find their way to other WTO members at these mini-ministerial meetings. However, one must remember that WTO members are rational. In other words, each country pursues its own interests, and Egypt is no exception.
Conclusion
Institutions are never perfect. The way the WTO, as an institution, runs its business may not be perfect either. Certainly, the WTO needs a tune-up so as to project a new image towards Arab countries. The WTO should permit accession of Arab countries into the organization at an accelerated rate. In addition, the WTO Secretariat should hire more staff from Arab countries. The WTO should include Arabic, a language spoken by 280 million people, as a working language along with the other three working languages (English, Spanish, and French) in the trade body.
Legally, all Arab countries should be able to accede to the WTO. According to article XII of the WTO Charter, any state that has full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations may accede to the WTO. This article begins the accession process. It seems that WTO accession is a power-based process, rather than a rule-based process. The U.S. backing-up of Arab countries to accede to the WTO is based on American foreign policy rather than commercial considerations.
The agreements covered by the WTO and its judicial decisions are voluminous.
The results of the Uruguay Round, for example, cover some sixty agreements, which amount to over 30,000 pages. It is understood that every word, sentence, and decision 79 WTO mini-ministerial meetings are new phenomenon at the WTO, usually hold in the run-up to ministerial conferences, in which "key" WTO members are invited to review progress and resolve key issues. It is unclear who organize such meetings whether the WTO or the host country. Other forum with limited membership is the Five Interested Parties in agricultural negotiation that include the U.S., EC, Australia, Brazil, and India. 
